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POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND
ALLOCATION OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
POWER
Linda Champlin* and Alan Schwarz**
INTRODUCTION

Although not discernible to the naked eye, it has been held, and
is generally agreed, that the United States, as a sovereign, has the
full panoply of foreign relations power possessed by all sovereigns.'
Whether this full blooded power is implied or "emergent" from the
scant constitutional text, or is extra-constitutional in origin, is more
an exercise than a problem, since all players begin with the assumption that the power exists. 2 To proclaim its sovereign existence, however, begs the important question of its allocation between the organs
of national sovereignty: The President and the two Houses of Congress. Although the allocation question is as old as the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has made little effort to supply answers 3 and has
Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School.
Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School-Newark.
We wish to thank Ethan Finneran and Fran Tesoriere for their research assistance on this
project.
1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-19 (1936); L.
*

**

1"ENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

26-27 (1972).

2. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 15-28.
3. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), aff'g Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689
(E.D. Pa. 1972); L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 90.
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recently indicated an even further reduction in that role.4
What could, and should have been the principal merit determination of a generation - the constitutionality of the Vietnamese
War - was "ducked" in a series of political'question summary decisions. 5 As this is being written, several political question controversies are boiling. The President has suggested that Congress (principally the Democrats) "lost" Lebanon because its threats to withdraw
American forces under the allegedly unconstitutional War Powers
Resolution 6 destroyed the credibility and hence impaired the safety
of the Marine presence.7 Secretary of State Schultz has stated that
the Act substantially impairs the effectiveness of America's foreign
policy - and asks if there is some way to determine its constitutionality.8 Meanwhile, Congress demands that the United States Israeli
embassy be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.9 The President suggests that he would veto any such legislation;' 0 arguably, embassy
location is derived from the exclusive Presidential power of recognition. Congressmen murmur about cutting off funds from a Tel Avivbased embassy. Simultaneously, controversy concerning the President's power to commit forces in Latin America" and the Persian
GulfP2 brews and festers. It seems incredible that after two hundred
years of life under a written constitution which delineates governmental power and its allocation, and which creates a Supreme Court
to definitively determine controversies about power and its allocation,
the most basic questions concerning allocation of the foreign affairs
power remain unanswered.
The judicial hands-off policy is principally accomplished
through the political question doctrine, whereby the Court either declines to hear such matters, or accepts, without its own independent
determination, the resolution by the coordinate branches of federal
4. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
5. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). See also Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611
(D.C. Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
6. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
7. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1984, at Al, col. 5. See also id., Feb. 7, 1984, at A22, col. 4;
Id., Feb. 2, 1984, at Al, col. 6; id., Jan. 26, 1984, at Al, col. 2. See generally id., Jan. 26,
1984, at Al, col. 2.
8. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1984, at Al, col. 1; id., March 2, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
9. N.Y. Times, March 27, 1984, at A26, col. 3; id., March 29, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
10. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
II. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1984, at A5, col. 1. See also id., Feb. 4, 1984, at AI, col. 5;
Id., Jan. 12, 1984, at A20, col. 1.
12. See N.Y. Times, March 2, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
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power or by one of them. Although it has been cut back in other
areas, 13 the doctrine is thriving and growing in its application to the
foreign relations power.14 In a recent decision, a Court plurality said
that it would not review the issue of who had the power to withdraw
the United States from a treaty, leaving that question for resolution
by a political struggle between the coordinate branches.1 5 The most
frequent reason given for the hands-off approach is that the constitution does not supply criteria for judicial resolution of the controversy. 16 It seems surprising that a court frequently able to fully dress
a textually nude equal protection or substantive due process clause,
feels so helpless when confronted with the at least scantily clad constitutionally delineated foreign relations power. That surprise is
heightened when the Court suggests that the doctrine will be invoked
on account of lack of substantive criteria on suit of a plaintiff with
barely adequate standing, but might not be invoked on suit of another plaintiff with a clearer injury. 17 Something more than lack of
criteria is clearly at work.
Judicial hands-off might be justified in some foreign relations
controversies, but the Court should be aware that a hands-off policy
is not cost free, particularly in separation of power claims. We do
not contend that the substance of foreign policy decisions will necessarily be improved under an allocation regime discovered or created
by the Court. That obviously depends upon the particular regime
created or discovered. But there is more involved than the effectiveness of a given foreign relations allocation structure. As indicated,
under one political question variant the Court validates and protects
13. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (question of whether duly elected
Congressman could be denied his seat by a vote of the members not a political question);

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (equal protection challenge to state legislative apportionment ruled justiciable).
14. See cases cited supra notes 3-5.
15. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
16. See id. at 1003; Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (no standard
regarding the existence of war and the division of power between the President and Congress,
suggesting that Congress could act if it wanted control), aFid sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 911 (1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (no standards to
determine whether President was acting consistent with his obligation to extricate U.S. forces
from Indochina); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (whether President may
order the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force to mine ports and harbors of

North Vietnam and to continue air and naval strikes on military targets in North Vietnam is
non-justiciable political question); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (no standard by which to determine what form Congressional participation must take in "making"
war), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92, 135.
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a coordinate branch decision that might well be unconstitutional; in
the other, it keeps hands entirely off, allowing resolution of a controversy, presumably governed by a constitutional norm, to be decided
by the power clash of coordinate branches. In the latter situation,
disorder is maximized, yet order may be particularly necessary in
foreign affairs. Indeed, as we shall discuss, order is the principal justification for the doctrine.
In both situations, another important value is compromised: Legitimacy itself. It may be argued that politicization of the
foreign affairs power is no better or worse than the garden variety
struggle between the branches on domestic policy, but the foreign
relations clashes encouraged by the political question doctrine are of
a different order. The judicially determined allocation of domestic
political power between the branches does not avoid stalemate, divisiveness and disorder. These are inherent in a system of checks and
balances. Both the President and Congress have powers that can and
are used to undercut or influence the decision of the other branch.
Congress, for example, can refuse to appropriate funds to implement
decisions of the President which are clearly within his power to
make. This can produce disorder, but the divisiveness is contained
because the ground rules are understood and agreed upon. When the
ground rules are not agreed upon, as in the Steel Seizure 8 or Impoundment disputes, 19 the Court discovers or creates them.
The political question doctrine, invoked in foreign affairs, also
involves disputes about the constitutional ground rules, about legitimacy. Here, however, unlike the domestic context, the Court usually 20 does not establish the constitutional ground rules; it conscientiously avoids doing so. It was argued, for instance, that President
Johnson not only adopted a wrong policy on Vietnam, but also that
he was acting illegitimately, as a usurper. And a handful of Congressmen proposed a resolution to impeach President Reagan based
on their claim that he was acting beyond his constitutional power in
Grenada. a ' How many others were awaiting the result of the invasion and the resultant polls to determine whether they should join?
18. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
19. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Train v. Campaign Clear Water,
Inc., 420 U.S. 136 (1975) (per curiam).
20. The Court will establish constitutional ground rules where it believes the constitutional standards are clear. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
21. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at A13, col. 1.
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The President, in implementing a foreign policy initiative without a
complete legislative sign-off, runs a double risk. First, he faces the
completely appropriate risk that the initiative will fail and he will be
politically responsible for that failure. But, secondly, whether or not
it fails, but especially if it fails, he risks being accused of usurpation,
of illegitimacy. Given the nature of the political question doctrine,
the charge cannot be proved or disproved. It will probably be forgotten if the policy is successful. It will provoke continuous and ugly
rancor if the policy fails. Abetted by the Court's refusal to provide
ground rules, foreign affairs allocation controversies are now fertile
grounds for divisiveness, based not only on the substance of policy,
but on its very legitimacy.
This Article attempts to show that the political question doctrine has been misunderstood and misused by the courts. It is our
position that the doctrine, properly construed, has only one application: Judicial protection of a coordinate branch decision, which
may or may not be constitutional, where the value of creating finality for that decision is more important than its constitutionality. The
doctrine should have essentially no application outside of foreign relations22 and, although theoretically applicable to some foreign affairs controversies, its practical utility even in that area should be
negligible. Specifically, the courts should refrain from invoking the
doctrine in any case that involves an allocation claim.
I.

THE DOCTRINE

While a number of factors have been suggested as creating a
political question, only two, lack of clear standards for judicial determination and the need to attribute finality to coordinate branch decisions, have been consistently and coherently articulated by the
courts. Finality is a basis for finding a political question. Absence of
standards should not be. The distinguishing feature of a true political question is in the nature of the disposition. It is frequently asserted that a political question is non-justiciable. Actually the court's
disposition of a true political question is assumption by the court of
the validity of the political decision due to an overwhelming need for
finality. Correctly understood, the "lack of standards" cases are sim22.

A challenge to an impeachment conviction is a possible exception. It is possible that

art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 of the Constitution will be construed as an unreviewable textual commitment
to the Senate. See infra note 32. If not, a court might well conclude that the consequences of

judicial interference with an impeachment conviction is worse than the possibly unconstitutional conduct in arriving at the conviction.
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ply merit determinations of constitutionality. They are neither in-

stances of non-justiciability nor assumptions of constitutionality.
A.

What Makes a Question "Political"?

When a court dismisses a case on political question grounds, it
is generally understood to have avoided making a merit determination of the constitutional issue. If so, it has taken an extreme position, for it has abdicated its most important function - Constitutional review. The circumstances that should cause a court to so rule

have been much discussed. Theoretical2 as well as functional 4 definitions of the political question doctrine have been advanced, and
various factors thought to be relevant to the political question have

been identified and discussed. The list of factors set out by Justice
Brennan in Baker v. Carr2 5 has become the standard.
Prominent .. . is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
23. The two outstanding theoretical positions on the political question doctrine are those
of Herbert Wechsler and Alexander Bickel. For Wechsler, the political question result is a
constitutional interpretation that the matter has been committed solely to another agency of
government.
[Tihe only proper judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the
Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than the courts. Difficult as it may be to make that judgment wisely,
whatever factors may be rightly weighed in situations where the answer is not clear,
what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and
judged by standards that should govern the interpretive process generally. That, I
submit, is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1959).
Bickel rejects Wechsler's view that the political question doctrine is a "usual" constitutional
interpretation, writing that "[t]here is something different about it, in kind, not in degree,
from the general 'interpretative process'; something greatly more flexible, something of prudence, not construction and not principle." Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Forward:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961). For Bickel, the doctrine's basis is:
the court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of the strangeness of the issue and the suspicion that it will have to yield more often and more
substantially to expediency than to principle; the sheer momentousness of it, which
unbalances judgment and prevents one from subsuming the normal calculations of
probabilities; the anxiety not so much that judicial judgment will be ignored, as that
perhaps it should be but won't; finally and in sum ("in a mature democracy"), the
inner vulnerability of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no
earth to draw strength from.
Id. at 75.
24. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976). Professor Henkin concludes that there is no political question doctrine. According to
Henkin, issues which have been held or suggested to be political questions are explicable in
more usual terms, principally failure to state a claim or equitable discretion.
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
26
question.
In the same opinion Justice Brennan quotes from Coleman v.
Miller,27 again defining the political question: "In determining
whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the

appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant con-

siderations.1 28 An examination of Justice Brennan's six factors

reveals that they are only a more detailed explication or examples of
the two categories set out in the quote from Coleman, i.e., need to
attribute finality to the political decision and lack of standards.
The finality value encompasses several strains. The basic concept is that the political course taken, even if unconstitutional, is
preferable to change when the consequences of change are intolerable. When acting as a sovereign in its relations with other sovereigns,
it may be of the utmost importance that the United States speak
with a single voice. Certainty and constancy may be crucial. Information that is and should remain secret may be relevant to the decision. Justice Brennan's fifth and sixth factors, "an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question,'

29

express these finality

concerns.
Lack of criteria is more difficult to understand and will be subsequently fully explored.30 It is apparent, however, that at least two
of Justice Brennan's other four factors are variations of the lack of
criteria theme. "[L]ack of judicially discoverable and manageable
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 217.
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (quoting Coleman, 307 U.S. at 454-55).
Id. at 217.
See infra text accompanying notes 39-61.
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or the impossibility of deciding without an initial pol-

icy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, ' 31
clearly refer to lack of criteria. The remaining two factors are somewhat less obvious, but at least one fits comfortably within Coleman's
lack of criteria prong. "[T]he impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government, '3 2 is either meaningless or another
expression of lack of standards. Whenever a court decides the constitutionality of a federal governmental activity, it is arguably expressing a lack of the respect due a coordinate branch of government. It
is not plausible that Justice Brennan meant to say that all challenges
to actions of a coordinate branch are political questions. Courts consistently review federal actions on constitutional grounds. 33 Therefore, implicit in the statement is the idea that only review of certain
coordinate branch activities shows disrespect. Justice Brennan does
not tell us when review shows disrespect. It is hard to imagine any
situation, other than when the court lacks standards. 4
Justice Brennan's first factor, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," is arguably distinct from the two Coleman categories. Insofar
as there is explicit language in the constitutional text clearly denying
judicial review of a given decision of a coordinate department, the
basis of non-interference or acceptance and protection by the court
would differ from absence of standards and the need to attribute finality to the political decision. In such a situation, if there be one,
the framers for their own reasons - the need for finality, lack of
standards, the importance of respect, or whatever - removed a subject from judicial review. So be it. The Court, however, has not, at
least not yet, based its decision that a given question was political on
the existence of clear textual language denying judicial review over
that matter. On the contrary, it has strained to avoid such a reading
even where the text arguably would support it.3 5 Since the Court is
31.
32.
33.

369 U.S. at 217.
Id.
Even if it is only when the court would decide the activity is unconstitutionalthat

lack of respect comes into play, there are numerous such cases, including, of course, Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983).
35. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell, the relevant constitutional language of article I, § 5, that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members," was not interpreted to preclude judicial review.
The Court declared unconstitutional the House of Representatives' refusal to seat Congress-
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supposed to do, and only to do, what the Constitution commands,

any decision that a question is political is ultimately the consequence
of a conclusion of textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of final decision to another instrumentality. But since it is the Court
that determines what the text clearly says, and since the Court has

not yet ever determined that the text clearly denies judicial review, a
decision that a question is political has been based, and one suspects
will continue to be based, solely on one or both of the Coleman criteria. If they are present the question will be deemed political even
where the text is unclear.3 6 If not present, no textual language ar-

37
guably denying review will be deemed sufficiently clear.
Justice Brennan. may have had this in mind when he said in
Baker that the constitutionality of the action of a state, as opposed
to Presidential or Congressional action, could never be a political

question.3 8 Why not? Did Brennan carefully peruse the various con-

stitutional provisions relating to state decisions and conclude that
none clearly deny judicial review, or did he conclude that none of the

factors that may make a question political inhere in state actions and
that therefore the text will be interpreted as exempting none of those

decisions from judicial review? If the latter, then Brennan is not only
functionally nullifying the clear textual commitment factor, he is
also probably telling us that only one of the two Coleman factors is
man Adam Clayton Powell, on account of misdeeds, concluding that "qualifications" were
limited to those specified in article I and that exclusion on other grounds was judicially reviewable. A more difficult textual commitment question would have been presented if Congress had
refused to seat Powell on the erroneous grounds that he was not an American citizen for at
least seven years or was not 25 years old.
The article I, § 3 trial of impeachment clause, which states that "[t]he Senate shall have
the sole Power to try all Impeachments," presents a stronger textual argument for preclusion
of judicial review than the language argued in Powell, although it is certainly not conclusive.
The question has been widely commented on. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 115-20 (1973); C.L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK, 54-55, 60-63
(1974); Rezneck, Is Judicial Review of Impeachment Coming?, 60 A.B.A. J. 681, 682-83
(1974). The issue has never arisen in the courts. There is no case that has held that explicit
constitutional language precludes review.
36. Coleman, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). For a
discussion of Luther, see infra n. 54.
37. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
38. Brennan reasoned that:
in . . "political question" cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary and the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the "political question."
• . .The non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
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really significant. There is absolutely no a priori reason why the criteria applicable to a state's action may not be as unmanageable as
those applicable to a federal action. Indeed, they are frequently the
very same criteria. If, nonetheless, state action cannot create a political question, it must be because the overwhelming need for finality,
which alone justifies use of the doctrine, exists only in respect of federal action. While the Court has raised the political question banner
in other contexts, it is our contention that overwhelming need for
finality probably only exists in respect of federal action in foreign
affairs.
B. Absence of Standards: Domestic Affairs
Textual commitment is a conclusion arrived at by independent
means, not a separate reason for finding something to be a political
question. If no independent reason exists for invoking the doctrine,
the text will not be interpreted to deny judicial review; if an independent reason does exist, the text will be interpreted to deny review or
the Court will abstain solely on the basis of that reason regardless of
the textual language. Hence, textual commitment adds nothing to
the political question doctrine. According to the Baker formulation,
then, we are left with finality and lack of criteria as the sole bases
for invocation of the doctrine. Finality has never been used as a basis
in a purely domestic controversy, and, possibly excepting review of a
presidential impeachment trial, 39 presumably never will be. Put simply, in the domestic context, finality is never more important than
constitutionality. Under the Baker formulation the sole remaining
reason for invoking the political question doctrine is "lack of criteria
for court resolution," and the few domestic cases utilizing the doctrine are based on this rationale.
Examination of domestic cases invoking the political question
doctrine demonstrates that they are really simply merit determinations of constitutionality. The most famous lack of criteria case is
Coleman v. Miller.40 There, plaintiff sought to enjoin Kansas from
recording its ratification of the child labor amendment on the ground
that it had previously been rejected by Kansas and that too much
time had elapsed before that state's eventual ratification. The Court
dismissed on political question grounds, stating that there was a lack
of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination. 1 What does that
39. See infra text between notes 109 and 110.
40. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
41. Id. at 453-54.
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mean? Professor Henkin suggests that Coleman is based on the de-

termination that since the Constitution states no time limitation on
the amending process,42 there are no such constitutional limits; hence

Kansas acted constitutionally and the claim should simply have been
dismissed on the merits as a failure to state a claim.43 According to
Henkin, it is unnecessary and confusing to dredge out that bizarre
vehicle -

the political question doctrine -

to accommodate the

simple merit dismissal of a non-claim.44 If, however, there clearly
were no limits on the amending process, it would seem strange to
talk about a lack of criteria; in that event, there would be a very

clear criterion, mandating validation. Therefore, it is possible that
the Court believed that there might be some limits - at some point,
for example, time lapse or various rejection-acceptance or acceptance-rejection patterns might offend an implicit constitutional requirement of consensus4 5 -

but that there was a lack of manageable

criteria necessary to define that precise point.
So understood, any such implicit amendment process limitation

differs little, if at all, from traditional constitutional inquiry. Most
litigated constitutional limitations are precisely of that variety:

Whether a search is reasonable, whether a confession is compelled,
whether aid to religion is an establishment, are all, at the margin,
similarly lacking clear guidelines for resolution. Indeed, some, like
whether a non-explicated right is sufficiently fundamental to warrant
constitutional protection, are considerably more amorphous. At the

edge, most constitutional standards are unmanageable, and resolu42. The Constitution provides that:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures
of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid . . . as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
U.S. CONsT. art. V.
43. See HENKIN, supra note 24, at 613.
44. Id.
45. Justice Black wrote separately in Coleman to say that the court never has a role in
reviewing the amendment process. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 457-58 (Black, J., concurring).
See also Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1137-39 (D. Idaho 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, Carmen v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); cf. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921)
(article V implies that amendments must be ratified within a reasonable period and Congress
may designate such a time period). For a different view of the relationship between article V
and the political question doctrine, see Millet, The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and
Article V - A Casefor Judicial Restraint, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 745 (1983).
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tion is often accomplished by a presumption of constitutionality. So,
too, with an implicit consensus limitation. Sometimes the congressionally prescribed ground rules for an amendment's adoption are
clearly consistent with an implicit consensus limitation, sometimes
they clearly are not, and sometimes it is difficult to determine because "consensus" blurs at the edges. In those last situations we will
presume constitutionality; we will defer to other institutions, we will
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hardly novel doctrine; hardly the
kind of stuff that should call forth bizarre vehicles.
The only other clear political question dismissals relating exclusively to domestic matters are the guarantee clause cases.46 In the
political question doctrine area where everything seems to be qualified, vague, contradictory or just plain nonsense, an oasis of clarity
exists - claims arising under the guarantee clause 47 are today, without qualification or exception, labeled political questions.4 8 It is only
relatively recently, however, that guarantee clause claims have been
so treated. Prior to Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon,49 most guarantee clause claims were adjudicated on the
merits.5 0 Although no challenge succeeded, the claims were not dismissed as political questions, but because the challenged activity was
constitutional. 1 Before and after Pacific, guarantee clause claims
typically challenged a particular aspect of governmental structure,
such as an initiative and referendum 52 or denial of sufferage to
women, 53 as being incompatible with republican form.5 4 Prior to Pa46. There are a few other domestic cases in which the Supreme Court has indicated that
the question presented was political, but in none is the dismissal squarely based on that doctrine. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (per
curiam). Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), which had been dismissed as a political
question, was effectively overruled by Baker, 369 U.S. at 234.
47. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government ..
" U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4.
48. Baker, 369 U.S. at 224.
49. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
50. For a listing of these cases, see HENKIN, supra note 24, at 609-10 n.36.
51. Id. See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905) (legislative creation and alteration of school district is compatible with republican form of government); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (denial of suffrage to women does
not offend republican form of government).
52. Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Kiernan v. Portland, 223
U.S. 151 (1912).
53. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
54. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), is the first case in which the political
question doctrine was raised in the context of a guarantee clause challenge. The claim in
Luther arose in the context of the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island. The plaintiff insisted that
the charter government had been displaced by the Dorr government which had been ratified by
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cific the Court held that the particular structure did not violate republican form; 55 after Pacific the Court held the matter to be a poa majority of the people of the state. The Court refused to consider the merits of the plaintiff's
claim, concluding that under the guarantee clause, "it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a [s]tate." Id. at 42. The Court cited several bases for its
conclusion: (I) the President's recognition of the charter government as the executive power
of the state, id. at 44; (2) the lack of standards for determinating whether the form of government was republican, id. at 45-46; and, (3) the disruptive effect of voiding the actions of a
state government as unrepublican, id. at 44-47. For a further discussion of Luther see Baker,
369 U.S. at 218-22.
The first factor, the President's validation, is insufficient to preclude judicial intervention.
There is no exclusivity language to support it; the guarantee clause states that the U.S. shall
guarantee a republican form of government, never specifying which branch. U.S. CONsT. art.
IV, § 4. Deference could be functionally based. Resolution of internal unrest demands prompt
action and might require armed federal intervention, and the judiciary could provide neither.
See Note, A Niche For the Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV. L. REV. 681, 682-83 (1981). If the
claim in Luther had been raised during the period of upheaval, finality concerns might justify
noninterference. However, the claim was in fact presented after a new, indisputably valid government was in place.
The second factor that the Court cited was absence of standards to determine whether the
government was republican. There was no basis on which the Court could conclude.that the
challenged government was not republican in form. In other words, the charter government
was not unconstitutional. In this regard Luther is merely an example of failure to state a cause
of action.
The third basis for noninterference speaks to the disruptive effects of voiding acts of an
unrepublican government. The Court noted:
[I]f this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry. . .and it should be decided
that the charter government had no legal existence during the period of time above
mentioned, - if it had been annulled by the adoption of the opposing government,
- then the laws passed by its legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes
wrongfully collected; its salaries and compensation to its officers illegally paid; its
public accounts improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of its courts in
civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions
into operation answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals.
Luther, 48 U.S. at 38-39. The Court could not avoid these consequences by limiting itself to
granting prospective relief, as the Court subsequently did in the apportionment cases (e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)), because the plaintiff sought only compensation for
past acts. A new, indisputably valid government was in place, removing any need for prospective relief.
The refusal to grant retroactive relief is necessitated by finality concerns; change is worse
than the unconstitutional conduct. In that respect, it is a political question, and the decisions
and actions of an unconstitutionally constituted government will be protected and implemented. The continued existence of that government is not necessitated by finality concerns,
and therefore is not a political question. There may be other reasons why prospective relief
cannot be granted, such as the remedy problem Frankfurter foresaw in the malapportionment
situation. See infra text accompanying notes 64-72. But this should merely result in a refusal
to grant a remedy, not in a refusal to decide the constitutionality of the government, although
if it is absolutely clear from the beginning that no remedy would be forthcoming despite a
finding of unconstitutionality, case and controversy problems may arise. See infra note Ill and
accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76 (1875).
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litical question. 6 In fact, the challenged activities did not violate the
Constitution because the republican form clause did not yield standards from which the court could conclude that the particular practice violated a presumption of constitutionality; more simply, the
clause did not prohibit the challenged activity. There is, however, a
value underlying the clause and some activity is clearly violative of
that value: A monarchy would surely violate the republican form
guarantee.57 Just as in Coleman, the Court's declaration of lack of
criteria signifies nothing more or less than that the challenged activity is not violative of a constitutional prohibition.
Actually, the traditionally slender, barely ascertainable guarantee value, "masquerading" as an equal protection claim in Baker v.
Carr,58 was considerably fattened in that case. Justice Brennan's
statement in Baker that the exact claim which constituted an equal
protection violation would be dismissed as a political question if
brought under the guarantee clause 59 is unconvincing. The only conceivable way to determine that malapportionment is unreasonable
discrimination, or that discrimination in voting is subject to a more
stringent standard than other discrimination, is to conclude that the
resulting distribution of political power is offensive to a constitutional norm. Since the equal protection clause60 does not itself supply
that norm, or any other, 6 ' a constitutional standard simply doesn't
exist or exists independently of that clause. If no standard can be
discovered, no constitutional prohibition is violated. If the standard
does exist outside the equal protection clause, the most likely place
for it to independently exist is the guarantee clause. A conclusion
that malapportionment violates equal protection is probably based on
the conclusion that it violates the guarantee clause, and in that
event, of course, the equal protection conclusion is wholly redundant.
While it is arguable that malapportionment offends a guarantee
value, it is not arguable that a standard absent in that clause can be
56.

See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).

57. For a different view of the guarantee clause, although one that also imposes substantive restraints enforceable by the courts, see Note: The Rule of Law and the States: A New
Interpretationof the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE LJ. 561, 561 (1984) ("the guarantee clause

should secure the 'rule of law' in the states by requiring, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, that the states either observe their own constitution and laws or change them by legally

valid procedures." Id. at 561 (footnote omitted)).
58. 369 U.S. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 227.
60.

"No State shall

. . .

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. See generally Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982).
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discovered in equal protection. If no standard governing malapportionment existed in the guarantee clause, malapportionment would
still not be a political question: It would simply be constitutional on
the merits under both clauses.
A comparison of the two dissenting opinions in Baker reveals
additional factors argued to be relevant to a political question disposition. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan both concluded (as we do)
that malapportionment is not an equal protection violation 6 2 Having
so concluded, Harlan would have simply dismissed the claim on the
merits. Since the equal protection claim does not contain standards
making malapportionment unconstitutional, he reasoned, malapportionment is constitutional: "The suggestion of my Brother Frankfurter that courts lack standards by which to decide such cases as
this, is relevant not only to the question of 'justiciability,' but also,
and perhaps more fundamentally, to the determination whether any
'6 3
cognizable constitutional claim has been asserted in this case."
Frankfurter's dissent, although nearly identical to Harlan's in
its view of the merits, characterizes the weakness in the claim as
creating not a merit deficiency, but a political question.6 4 There are
two possible reasons for this difference in manner of disposition, one
spelled out in the opinion, the second only suggested. Both rationales
are species of the genus that another factor creating a political question is the goal of protecting the prestige and power of the Court.
The first principle asserts that if the Court cannot constitutionally invalidate noxious governmental action because the action is
constitutional, it should abstain from any decision, rather than in
some measure legitimate the action through a validating decision.65
The political question doctrine is thus asserted to be one of the several "passive virtues."6 6 Since the Court is not a bully pulpit, the
doctrine, so used, should be invoked by summary disposition without
opinion. Where some explanation is necessary the resultant opinion
should be long on poetry and short on precision. Lack of standards
language - translation - it's constitutional but we don't like it and
therefore won't validate it - seems appropriate to that end. That
62. Baker, 369 U.S. 301-02 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 331-32 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 277-78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
65. Where malapportionment was clearly unconstitutional, Justice Frankfurter did not
abstain. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). For a discussion of Frankfurter's position on malapportionment, see R. BICKE., THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 193-94 (1962).
66. See generally R. BICKEL, supra note 65, at 183-98.
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may be a fair description of Frankfurter's opinion, or at least of that
portion concerning the "merits" of malapportionment.
A second rationale is made explicit in the Frankfurter opinion.
He stresses not only that there is a lack of standards governing the
constitutionality of malapportionment - i.e., that malapportionment
is constitutional - but also that there is a lack of standards governing the appropriate remedy even if the practice were unconstitutional.6 7 Important to Frankfurter's refusal to intervene is his anticipation that because of a political impasse regarding a new
legislatively determined apportionment, the Court would have to
construct one itself. Since a near infinite number of apportionment
variations would satisfy constitutional requirements (at least as suggested by the three Justices who wrote concurring opinions), 68 and
since a court would have to choose among them, the court selecting a
remedy would necessarily be drawn into the thicket of partisan politics.69 To avoid that result, Frankfurter would not intervene even if
the practice were unconstitutional. His reason for this abstinence is
to protect the court as an institution.
[Intervention] may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate
organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal
problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling on which this
Court must pronounce. The Court's authority - possessed of
neither the purse nor the sword - ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from inject70
ing itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.
Indeed, given the state of the merits as they seemingly existed
circa Baker, and given the great difficulty legislatures had in reapportioning themselves, Frankfurter's fears were realistic. Although
Baker was a substantial departure from past precedent,71 the sea
67. Baker, 369 U.S. at 278 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 243-44 (Douglas, J., concurring), 254, 261 (Clark, J., concurring), 265-66
(Stewart, J., concurring).
69. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553, 556 (1946).
70. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7 1. See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (suit challenging congressional districts as violative of equal protection dismissed, since such determinations are properly left to the political
process), reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 825, motion for rehearing en banc denied, 329 U.S. 828
(1946).
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change awaited Reynolds v. Sims.7 2 All but the dissenting opinions
in Baker spoke in terms of malapportionment being constitutional so
long as not irrational 3 so long as short of the topsy turvical.7 4 Justice Stewart couldn't even understand what the fuss was all about.
He saw nothing in the majority decision "to prevent a State, acting
not irrationally, from choosing any electoral legislative structure it
thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and customs of its people."7 5 Frankfurter realized that given the problem of remedy, there
was no half way. Either rotten boroughs were to be allowed to continue, albeit without judicial legitimation, or a precise substantive
standard much more normative than irrationality would have to be
created. He was right. Reynolds created a one person - one vote
standard within two years of Baker.
The thrust of the Frankfurter opinion is that in regard to some
substantive issues the Court will make its greatest contribution by
doing as little as possible. That may be, but, as we shall show, the
political question doctrine should not be made a vehicle for this purpose. Its theoretical function is very different from passivity, and inclusion of that value causes utter confusion in considering the nature
of the disposition to follow a political question determination. 6
C. The Nature of the Disposition
The significance and uniqueness of the political question doctrine, indeed its reason for being, is the nature of the disposition following a finding that a controversy is a political question. The standard language is that a political question creates a non-justiciable
controversy, to be resolved through the political process, not by the
courts.7 Non-justiciability, however, exists separately from the political question doctrine. Standing, ripeness and mootness, for example,
72.

377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court adopted "one man - one vote" as the

districting standard.

73. Baker, 369 U.S. at 244-45 (Douglas, J.,concurring), 254 (Clark, J.,
concurring),
265 (Stewart, J., concurring).

74. Id. at 254 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
75. Id. at 265 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
76. Several commentators have supported the proposition that the Court should abstain
from deciding certain issues in order to protect the prestige and jurisdiction of the Court. See
R. BICKEL, supra note 65, at 183-98 (1962); J.CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV.
338, 344 (1924). Professor Choper, however, specifically disassociates his proposal from the
political question doctrine. J.CHOPER, supra this note, at 361.
77. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-03 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1939).
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are situations where the status of a party disables her from invoking
judicial action over an issue. In the political question context, by
contrast, the issue itself, independent of the status of the parties, has
been termed non-justiciable. It would appear then that while a case
dismissed because of party status might subsequently be adjudicated
in other circumstances, a political question, as a non-justiciable issue, would, like the ancient mariner, forever roam the seas, never to
be resolved. It is our position that a political question resolution is
not a subset of non-justiciability, but rather a particular type of
merit determination.
We agree that in a true political question the court neither determines the issue nor interferes with the political decision. It differs
from an ordinary merit decision where the court refrains from interference only when and because it determines the political action to
be valid. In the true political question, the court assumes rather than
determines validity for reasons external to the validity of the political action taken, such as an overwhelming need for finality. Since
the processes of validation are different, the precedential consequences should also be different. Since validity is assumed and not
determined, the decision should not be a precedent on the issue of
validity and the court should protect the political action only so long
as the overwhelming need for finality exists. In all other respects,
however, both processes should result in a merit decision that protects the political action from interference by the reviewing court or
by any other institution, and which should be implemented by the
court in a subsequent enforcement proceeding.
So described, a political question resolution is a merit decision,
not a subset of non-justiciability as it is almost always characterized.
Does it make any difference? There is no difference in terms of interference by a reviewing court in a lawsuit brought to attack the
political action. In that context a court will refrain from interference
whether disposition be by determination of validity, assumption of
validity, or determination of issue non-justiciability. A court's necessary and proper role, however, is not limited to passive non-interference with a valid political decision. It also has the vital, active function of protecting the political decision from interference by all
others and of taking jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought to
implement the political decision. Those functions exist and operate to
the extent a political question resolution is considered the equivalent
of a merit decision; they do not if it is characterized as an instance
of non-justiciability.
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A true political question, at least as the term is used here, is
presented when it is necessary for a court to defer to the political
branch determination of the constitutionality of its own action because interference with that action would cause intolerable consequences. In such situations, the court abdicates its usual judicial review function, accepting the political determination that the
challenged action is constitutional. The doctrine has both a substantive and a procedural aspect. Substantively, invocation of the political question doctrine is a determination that finality is more important under the circumstances than a judicial assessment of
constitutionality. It follows as a procedural matter that the challenged action is thereby immunized from disruption by the reviewing
court. Moreover, the finality value which triggers the doctrine dictates that the coordinate branch decision, in addition to being immune from the instant court's interference, be immune from any
other interference, 78 and that the courts should assume jurisdiction
over implementing enforcement proceedings. A political question resolution, then, is almost the opposite of non-justiciability. Far from
being neutral and non-active, a court, having decided that an issue is
a political question, should accept the coordinate branch decision
and be receptive to actions brought to force the rest of the world to
do the same. In terms of disposition, it is exactly equivalent to a
merit determination of constitutionality. It differs only in that valid9
ity is assumed rather than judicially determined.7
We believe that the significance and uniqueness of the political
question doctrine is the nature of the resulting disposition: A merit
decision in which validity is assumed, not determined. That disposi78.

One such source of interference is a state court. In Goldwater v. Carter,Justice

Rehnquist specifically and gratuitously says that a political question dismissal, like a mootness
dismissal, may not be binding on state courts, so long as the state courts "do not trench upon
exclusively federal questions of federal policy." 444 U.S. 996, 1005 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.).
For further discussion on this point, see infra note 149.
79. The Act of State doctrine is analogous in terms of disposition. As stated by the

Supreme Court in Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), the Act of State
doctrine:

does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires only
that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a given
way on the subject matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of
the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for
their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is not a sur-

render or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of it.
Id. at 309 (emphasis added). The political question doctrine, like the Act of State doctrine, is

a rule of decision, not a rule of abstention. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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tion should be limited to situations where finality is more important
than right, and is therefore inappropriate where lack of standards

and concern for the role of the Court have traditionally been considered relevant to invocation of the doctrine. These other factors, to

the extent that they are legitimate factors, relate to determination of
validity, not assumption of validity, and therefore require no separate doctrine.80 They, too, however, yield merit decisions, not deter-

minations of issue non-justiciability. In fact, we doubt whether there
is, in any context, such a thing as issue non-justiciability. 8 1
80. Court role concerns, if accepted as valid considerations in determining the disposition of a controversy, also do not result in issue non-justiciability. The Court, of course, has
never explicitly included the avoidance of legitimating noxious or unconstitutional activity as a
political question factor. That it is a factor is exclusively the surmise of some commentators,
most notably Professor Bickel. See R. BICKEL, supra note 65.
If this concern is a factor in judicial determination, it could have two applications. First,
where the activity is constitutional, but noxious, dismissal of an action to enjoin that activity
on political question grounds is a merit determination. Use of the political question label in
this situation would simply be a device to avoid legitimation. The activity would not be interfered with, would, if necessary, be implemented, and would be protected against interference
by others.
We do not know that the doctrine has ever been used when the activity was unconstitutional, but for reasons of self-protection could not be so ruled. If so used it would also be a
decision on the merits, as would become obvious in any necessary ensuing enforcement proceeding. Although a decision on the merits, it is certainly not of the garden variety. For here,
like the situation where finality is implicated, the Court would be upholding the activity for
reasons external to its validity and assuming, rather than determining, validity. It would, to
that extent, be a political question disposition as the term is here defined.
81. Justice Jackson's dissenting position in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), is probably an example of true issue non-justiciability. The petitioner in that case was
appealing a conviction in a federal district court for remaining in a military area contrary to
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 issued by the Army. Justice Jackson, dissenting, refused to
affirm the conviction. He believed that military expedients cannot always conform to Constitutional restraints, but also believed that the Constitution should not be skewed to accommodate
what is militarily necessary. He then stated how a judge should proceed:
My duties as a justice as I see them do not require me to make a military judgment
as to whether General DeWitt's evacuation and detention program was a reasonable
military necessity. I do not suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task. But I do not think they may be asked to
execute a military expedient that has no place in law under the Constitution. I
would reverse the judgment and discharge the prisoner.
Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
It appears that Justice Jackson would also refuse to hear the habeas corpus petition of a
person held by the army in similar circumstances. If so, this is an example of true issue nonjusticiability. It also points out one of its weaknesses. Under this view, the military decision is
completely immune from judicial scrutiny. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbitino, 376 U.S.
398, 470-72 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
In a recent book, Professor Choper proposes that most constitutional allocation of power
questions be treated as non-justiciable issues. J. CHOPER, supra note 76. Under his proposal,
the court would not determine the constitutional separation issue between Congress and the
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Further consideration of the disposition problem provides independent proof, or at least buttresses the conclusion, that lack of manageable standards in the context of allegedly wrongful exercise 2 is
actually simply a merit determination of constitutionality, not a species of non-justiciability. Coleman v. Miller"a is said to have been
decided on political question grounds, as an instance of issue nonjusticiability.8 4 Assume, however, that Congress proposes a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortions in some circumstances
where they are presently constitutionally protected, and provides
ground rules for state ratification of the amendment which arguably
violate a presumed consensus value implicit in the amendment
clause. An action, predicated on violation of such a consensus requirement, is brought to vacate the "successful" amendment; on the
authority of Coleman, that action is dismissed as a non-justiciable
political question. Compare the situation where the United States, as
authorized by implementing legislation, prosecutes a doctor for performing a prohibited abortion. Defendant argues that the legislation
is unconstitutional because the amendment on which it is based is
unconstitutional. What does the Supreme Court do on appeal of the
conviction? We assert that it would affirm the conviction based upon
the merit determination made in Coleman, if Coleman is still good
law on the merits. If Coleman really stood for the proposition that
the consensus issue is non-justiciable because the Court cannot decide what consensus means, then the decision below should be vacated. A court cannot deprive one of his liberty without ensuring an
opportunity to have his constitutional claim determined.8 5 A court,
President, but would implement the challenged action. Id. at 349-50, 352. See generally id. at
260-377. This form of "non-justiciability" is indistinguishable from a decision on the merits
upholding the challenged action, except that the court avoids formally siding with either Congress or the President. From the dispostion perspective, this proposal is directly analogous to
the situation where a court would hold a matter to be non-justiciable because, although consti-

tutional, it is noxious. See supra note 80. We submit that both are in fact merit determinations. A truly non-justiciable issue means that the challenged action would be neither inter-

fered with nor implemented by the court, as Justice Jackson proposes in Korematsu, 323 U.S.
214.

82. For a discussion of a possible distinction between lack of standards in the wrongful
exercise and allocation contexts see infra pp. 253-54.
83. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
84. Id. at 454.
85. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 341

(2d ed. 1973). As discussed, we disagree with Justice Jackson's conclusion that there is (or
could be) such a thing as a non-justiciable issue. See supra note 81. Jackson, however, recognized that if an issue is non-justiciable, it is always so. Accordingly, although he would not

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 1
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:215

at most, could hold, whether or not it said so, that the amendment
process is arguably constitutional, and is therefore presumed constitutional. That is simply a common garden variety merit determination, having no resemblance to either non-justiciability or to the political question doctrine.
Lack of standards in the allocation context presents a more difficult problem. For instance, in Goldwater v. Carter,"6 plaintiffs U.S.
Senators asserted that President Carter did not have constitutional
authority to unilaterally withdraw the United States from its treaty
with Taiwan. The plurality opinion ruled that the Constitution does
not contain a standard allocating the withdrawal power that is sufficiently clear to permit a merit determination.8 7 Hence, it dismissed
the case as a non-justiciable political question. As we shall subsequently discuss,88 it is much harder to resolve a foreign policy allocation claim than a wrongful exercise claim, by presumption. To the
extent that such a claim cannot be decided because there are no criteria for decision,"9 a true non-justiciable issue may be said to exist.
But even if such an animal does exist, it is confusing and inaccurate
to call it a political question, for it would have to exist in all its
transfigurations, including any necessary enforcement proceedings to
implement the decision to withdraw. If no standard of decision exists, the Court would be unable to assert jurisdiction to enforce and
implement the withdrawal decision - a necessary function in a true
political question situation. 90
That same plurality opinion, however, indicates that issue nonjusticiability may evaporate in the crunch. Justice Rehnquist suggests that the issue might be decided in a suit involving an injured
private party rather than a disputatious Senator.91 Since the clarity
of the standard obviously does not vary with party status, any such
enjoin the detention, he also would not enforce the detention order. Professor Choper, on the
other hand, would have the court enforce political decisions without determining constitutional
separation of powers issues. He distinguishes division of power constitutional claims from individual rights claims. J. CHOPER, supra note 76 at 60-128, 260-380.
86. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
87. Id. at 1002-03 (Rehnquist, J.).
88. See infra pp. 253-54.
89. We, however, offer criteria for decision of such a claim. See infra text accompanying
notes 151-58.
90. In Goldwater, Justice Rehnquist, relying on Coleman, concludes there is a political
question because of lack of standards. He also labels the political question a form of nonjusticiability which, like a mootness dismissal, is not necessarily binding on state courts. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J.). See infra note 149.
91. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004-05 (Rehnquist, J.).
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difference in result indicates that the Court is merely avoiding a difficult question for as long as it is able. If and when real injury
threatens, it will have to decide: First, because the Court cannot
allow a constitutional injury to continue merely because it finds the
issue intellectually difficult; and second, because the Court cannot
relinquish its duty to protect and implement a valid political decision. In the end, the issue becomes justiciable. Its temporary avoidance seems more the product of standing doctrine than issue non-

justiciability or anything that could coherently be called the political
question doctrine. Indeed, issue non-justiciability language ordinarily
masks either a defect in party status or, more often, a determination
of merit constitutionality.9 2 The fallacy that non-justiciable issues
exist persists only because so many allegedly unconstitutional actions
do not involve any enforcement proceeding.
If a true political question9" is a merit decision indistinguishable
92. See supra note 80.
93. One commentator concludes that there is no such thing as a political question. Henkin, supra note 24, at 600-01. We believe Professor Henkin erred because he focused on the
anticipatory suit. He believes, as we do, that a determination of lack of manageable standards
in a wrongful exercise case is actually a judicial determination of merit constitutionality, no
different from any other merit determination. Id. at 606, 610, 612-13. He also believes, however, that the residue - the situations involving an overwhelming need for finality - are
easily manageable within standard independent doctrine, namely, remedy law. An overwhelming need to attach finality to the decision of another branch, even where that decision is unconstitutional, results in a situation where there is a right without a remedy. There are other
situations where that dichotomy exists, he reasons, and since they are resolved by usual remedy law, this instance should not require a separate doctrine. Id. at 606, 617-24.
There is, however, a basic distinction between the two situations. In the no remedy case,
the court first determines that a right exists, leading to the paradox of a right without a remedy. In the true political question, the court assumes that no right exists, that the action is
constitutional. And this very different methodology is purposeful and necessary. A court's inability to provide an immediate remedy ordinarily would not and should not prevent it from
making a merit determination. It will decide the merits because circumstances do not compel
it to protect or implement the political decision; a decision of unconstitutionality is not a problem. What Professor Henkin fails to address is the situation where finality is essential. Here,
the court does not make a merit determination - it assumes constitutionality - because it is
prepared, if necessary, to actively implement and protect the coordinate branch decision. For
instance, if the constitutionality of a war is a political question, the court should and would
protect that decision by imposing punishment on prosecuted draft resisters. See Tigar, Judicial
Power, the "PoliticalQuestion Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135,
1175-78 (1970). Since it is simply "too much" to actively implement a decision just determined to be unconstitutional, the Court, in a political question, assumes constitutionality.
Although we disagree with Professor Henkin's assertion that there is no need for the doctrine since its paradigm example can be easily disposed of through remedy law, he is correct
insofar as the Court sometimes confuses the right without a remedy situation with political
questions. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Baker is an example. He said that even if
malapportionment were unconstitutional it should be regarded as a political question because
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from the lack of standards case in terms of disposition, why do we
not then just call the decision one of simple merit constitutionality?
Although all political questions are merit decisions, the merits are
decided in very different ways. Decisions validating action on the
ground of inadequate standards are essentially indistinguishable
from other constitutional merit determinations. Not so with respect
to true political questions, where there is an overwhelming need for
finality. There, the merits are not examined at all: The need for
finality requires the court to assume constitutionality without an independent examination. A very raraavis that differs from the notion
that even the most imperative command bends to compelling necessity. The necessity that invokes the doctrine is not the world beyond
the actor's control, but is created by the very action that is argued to
be unconstitutional.
It would be most difficult to incorporate this finality value into
an independent judicial examination of the merits. The outcome
might be a determination that the coordinate branch action is constitutional because it is unconstitutional and not rectifiable, and that
therefore the Court will not interfere with the decision but will
rather protect and implement it. It would be better to avoid any independent examination, except, of course, an examination of the
magnitude of the finality constraint. If a true political question is
recognized for what it is, then it is not the issue itself that invokes
the doctrine, but the need for finality, and that need may not exist if
a suit is brought either before the action is taken or after the finality
of the immense difficulties that the judiciary would have in fashioning a remedy. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 67-69. Assuming that Frankfurter was right in his estimate of those difficulties, that
would, at most, be a reason to deny a remedy, not a reason for holding the controversy to be a
political question. If malapportionment itself were a political question, nothing should be done
to remedy it, and it should be protected and implemented. But there is no reason why malapportionment should be a political question. It should be either constitutional or unconstitutional on the merits. If self protection considerations militate against a prospective judicial
remedy, then no remedy need be given. Here, we do have simply a right without a remedy, at
least without the remedy of judicial reapportionment. That situation, however, does not require
that the Court protect the malapportionment against other institutions - say the State executive or judiciary. It does not even require that the Court decline to rule the apportionment
unconstitutional. A decision that the challenged activity is unconstitutional coupled with a
refusal to remedy the violation makes it crystal clear that the Court is unwilling or unable to
remedy unconstitutional conduct. Although this could hurt the prestige of the Court, it has the
advantage of a clear decision on the merits which places an obligation, albeit not judicially
enforceable, on the political branches. The same problem regarding retroactive relief is present
here, as in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), or any guarantee clause challenge.
See supra note 54.
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concern has lessened. 94 This is different from an ordinary garden variety merit determination and should be recognized as such. The political question designation is the means of conveying that, unlike an
ordinary decision on the merits, the political decision is being accepted without independent judicial inquiry because the consequences of change are intolerable.
II.

THE DOCTRINE'S APPLICATION TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS

There is essentially" 5 no need for a political question doctrine in
domestic affairs. In fact, functionally, the doctrine does not there
exist. Its domestic application has been limited to lack of standards
situations which, as we have shown, are really judicial determinations of merit constitutionality. 6 The evolved history of the doctrine
in its principal domestic application - the republican guarantee
clause - demonstrates that the "doctrine" is empty rhetoric. When
a challenged action was deemed to be arguably democratic, it was
held to be a political question on account of lack of standards, 97 and
when deemed undemocratic, it was invalidated 8 It is more accurate
and less confusing to simply conclude that arguably republican
forms are constitutional and clearly non-republican forms are unconstitutional. Although the domestic application has not been formally
repudiated, it was last used by the Court in 1946.11 The doctrine,
however, has had continued and growing vitality in foreign affairs.100
The costs created by the doctrine's application to issues concerning allocation of the foreign affairs power are enormous. Because
the ground rules remain unsettled, power tends to flow to whichever
may then be the politically more powerful institution, without refer94. For example, assume the President of the United States is convicted by the Senate
of an impeachable offense under circumstances that in a usual criminal proceeding would be a
denial of due process. He challenges the conviction in court. The Justices believe that they
cannot decide for the President, either because the consequences of confusion with regard to
who is President at any given time are intolerable, see C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 54-55, 61-62 (1974), or because change itself is intolerable. They might label such an

action a political question, but perhaps might not do so if the action were brought in anticipation of the Senate trial.
95. We say "essentially" instead of "absolutely" because impeachment might be a political question. See supra note 22.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 39-92.

97.

See supra text accompanying notes 46-57.

98.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

99. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). The Supreme Court has referred to the
doctrine as being relevant in subsequent cases, but has not dismissed squarely on that basis.

See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1973); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 2-5 (1972).
100.

See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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ence to whether it is best equipped to exercise the power. This unsettled condition prevents either institution from acting decisively, since
each has the means to weaken the other's position and the lack of
ground rules legitimates the use of such means. The result is foreign
policy by stalemate. Moreover, decisive action, even if otherwise possible, carries political risk. This is as it should be, but where the
ground rules are unsettled the risks become excessive. The unsuccessful policy becomes more than a serious or even disastrous mistake: It becomes a usurpation of power. Faced with these risks,
there is a tendency to do as little as possible. Finally, the national
debate shifts from the merits of proposed action to its legitimacy.
That deflects from careful consideration of the merits and encourages demagogy.
A. Allocation and Finality
The allocation ground rules remain unsettled because the Supreme Court considers them political questions, and in the foreign
affairs context, unlike the domestic sphere, a determination that an
issue is political sometimes means that it is non-justiciable 01 Why is
the judicial response to a foreign affairs controversy so different from
one involving domestic concerns? 102 Why is a political question disposition in a foreign affairs controversy sometimes the protection and
implementation of a coordinate branch decision without an independent merit determination by the Court,10 3 and sometimes the
equivalent of issue non-justiciability? 0 4 How can such opposite dispositions stem from the same doctrine?
The Court refers to the same factors as contributing to the creation of a political question in domestic and foreign affairs 10 5 and
most of them seem equally irrelevant to both. The Court has never
held that any controversy, domestic or foreign, has been committed
to one of the political branches for final determination by virtue of
clear constitutional text. Nor does lack of standards, at least as used
and defined in the domestic context, have any different or greater
application in foreign affairs controversies. Consider a controversy
101. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.). See infra pp.
248-49.
102. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
103. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38
U.S. (13 Pet.)'415, 419-20 (1839).
104. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
105. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-25 (1962); Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996, 997-1002 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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involving the claim that the federal government, operating with the
concurrence of both political branches, acted unconstitutionally in

the foreign affairs realm. Parsed, such a claim could have two elements: Either the United States acted without authority, or it exe-

cuted its authority wrongfully, in violation of a constitutional prohibition. Lack of authority claims are non-extant because it is assumed
that the United States has a complete foreign affairs power. 1°0

Wrongful exercise claims can and do exist, and it has been held that
the constitutional prohibitions defining wrongful exercise apply

equally to the foreign and domestic powers. 107 This may overstate
the case, since there probably should be more "play" in a prohibition
as applied in a foreign affairs context. 0 8 But regardless of whether
the standard be uniform or different, the Court can and does determine the scope of the prohibition and decides the merits of the con-

troversy. In upholding the action, the Court sometimes uses political
question language, but is in actuality rendering a merit decision either that the action is not wrongful under a unitary standard or is
not wrongful because a different standard is being adopted. 0 9 It is
106. See supra note I and accompanying text.
107. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
108. For example, the Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Girard,rejected the claim that trial
of a soldier stationed abroad by the courts of the country where the crime took place violated
due process. 354 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1957). See also Henkin, supra note 24, at 611-13; Nathanson, The Supreme Court as a Unit of the National Government: Herein of Separation
of Powers and Political Questions, 6 J. PuB. L. 331, 359-62 (1957).
109. The two most noted cases in this regard are Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
Waterman involved a challenge by a contender for a foreign air route to the presidential grant
of the route to a competitor airline. Waterman attempted to appeal the decision under a statute that subjected to judicial review all orders issued by the Board pursuant to the statute,
except any order in respect of a foreign air carrier. 333 U.S. at 105-06. Although Waterman
was not a foreign air carrier, the Supreme Court construed the statute to deny appeal whenever the Board order required presidential approval because it involved overseas and foreign
air transportation. Id. at 106-11. Harisiadessustained the deportation of a lawfully admitted
permanent resident alien because of previous communist party affiliation even though, at the
time of the affiliation, it was legal. 342 U.S. at 581-96.
In each case, the Court upheld the political decision using language that characterized the
decision as "political," one which the Court should not review. Despite such language, Professor Henkin concludes, as we do, that these cases are not examples of political questions, for the
Court, in fact, neither refused to decide the issue nor accepted, without examination, the political decision. Henkin, supra note 24, at 611-13. For a contrary view of these cases see Scharpf,
supra note 24, at 578-82.
These cases present difficulty because the objects of regulation are persons to whom constitutional protections apply, yet there are direct foreign policy implications in the decisions.
See Nathanson, supra note 108, at 359-61. In our truly external relationships, where we are
acting upon a foreign state, it is likely that there are no substantive constitutional restrictions.
We can make an alliance with the devil or go to war with an angel. There are no substantive
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neither accepting a coordinate branch decision without examination,
nor refusing to decide the issue. It is therefore not really invoking
the political question doctrine in either configuration - assuming for
the moment that the doctrine does have two configurations in foreign
affairs.
The third purportedly relevant factor - finality - appears to
provide a rational foundation for a true political question resolution,
and to be especially, perhaps uniquely, applicable to foreign affairs.
"Finality" measures the concern that a decision, once made, not be
changed; it does not incorporate the different issue of the public importance of the original decision. "Compelling necessity" is a gloss
excepting all constitutional rights from protection. There is no need
for the political question doctrine to handle the claim that what otherwise would be a constitutional infringement is saved by the overwhelming need for the action taken, since merit constitutionality
subsumes all such situations, whether of foreign or domestic origin.
There may, however, be situations where there is a compelling reason for not altering course, whether or not there was a compelling
reason for choosing that course or even whether or not the chosen
course was constitutional. Conviction by the Senate of an impeached
President may be such a situation of domestic origin, the only one
we can think of. It is likely that there are more numerous situations
in foreign affairs. Disorder produced by a declaration of unconstitutionality is always manageable in the domestic context because we
expect and can readily require Americans and American institutions
to obey judicial processes. Foreign governments, however, are not
amenable to American judicial powers. If the Court declared a war
or a treaty commitment unconstitutional, the consequences might be
overwhelming. Indeed, if the impeachment situation is a political
question, it is probably, most importantly, because of its disruptive
effects on foreign relations.
Of course, it does not follow that all constitutional controversies
involving foreign relations are political questions. 1" 0 Many, perhaps
restraints because foreigners outside the United States have no rights under the U.S. Constitution, L. HENKIN, supra note 1,at 267, and because finality is of great value. See infra p. 242.
In these cases, the object of the exercise of power is either a U.S. citizen or a person within the
territorial United States, and hence there may well be substantive constitutional restraints. Yet
the direct foreign policy implications might call for greater freedom of action on the part of
the U.S. officials whose exercise of power is being challenged.
This analysis is also applicable to issues involving military decision making. See Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
110. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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most, are not, because there is seldom an overwhelming need for finality even in foreign affairs. To the extent that such a need can be
demonstrated, however, and to the extent that the finality need is not
independently accommodated by an interpretation of the scope of the
utilized power, 1 ' the political question doctrine performs a useful
role. If it is determined as a threshold matter - and it should be a
threshold matter"1 2 - that there is a compelling need to stay on
course, whether or not there was a compelling need to adopt that
course, the Court should not interfere with the political decision; if
necessary, it should protect and implement that decision.
The Court should not, however, make a merit determination, for
to do so in those circumstances would create an unsatisfactory dilemma. There would be tremendous pressure, internal as well as external, to validate the action taken, thus unnecessarily skewing correct doctrine in a situation where the overwhelming finality need did
not exist. Alternatively, as one commentator seems to suggest, the
Court might declare the action unconstitutional, but withhold a remedy."' 3 But this approach has several defects. First, if it is decided as
a threshold matter that no remedy will be given, now or later, the
matter may not be a case or controversy within article III requirements." 4 Second, there is little point in further politicizing the situation where, by definition, the course is unalterable. 115 Third, if staying the course is imperative, it may be imperative for the Court to
protect and implement the decision as well as to refrain from interference. It is indefensible for a court to declare a decision unconstitutional and simultaneously aid in its enforcement.
Although disputes involving the constitutionality of a joint exercise of the United States foreign relations power by the two political
branches could, on account of the finality concern, be political questions, the doctrine has not been invoked for that reason in respect of
such controversies. It has instead been used in disputes involving the
11I. It is likely, for instance, that the finality need would result in a construction that
there are no constitutional limits on the war making power as exercised jointly by the President and Congress. If any such limits were implied, however, it is likely that the controversy
would be deemed a political question.
112. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
113.

See supra note 93.

114. Cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (where plaintiff fails to allege
personal stake in outcome of controversy, court may dismiss for lack of standing). In this case,
the dissent suggested the absence of a live, on-going controversy. Id. at 622 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
115. But see infra pp. 247-48 (contending that finality concerns should never invoke the
doctrine in an allocation dispute).
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wholly different issue of the allocation of that power between the
coordinate federal branches.116 The simmering, non-litigated constitutional controversies concerning foreign relations are also all in that
1 17
category.
Allocation questions concerning foreign affairs arguably implicate both substantive components of the doctrine. Unilateral presidential actions committing United States forces, prestige and honor
may so irrevocably define a course that extrication by court order is
impossible. The cure would be worse than the disease. Moreover, an
absence of standards seems to have an operative significance here,
lacking in the domestic context and in the context of jointly made
foreign policy initiatives. It is our contention, however, that, properly
considered, the political question doctrine should have no applicability to allocation questions.
Wrongful exercise claims - i.e., actions claimed to be in violation of a constitutional prohibition - present no different methodological difficulties in the foreign or domestic context. Absence of
standards, therefore, is equally inapposite to both. 18 All wrongful
exercise claims, in the absence of an overwhelming need for finality,
should receive a determination on the merits. Allocation claims in
the domestic area are no different. According to the constitutional
text, confirmed by all the opinions in the Steel Seizure Case,119 the
President has scant domestic power and none in contravention of
congressional policy. In many areas in the foreign context, however,
the allocation question is far from clear. Text, history, precedent and
pragmatic concerns do not resolve real uncertainty as to the intended, or otherwise proper, distribution of the power. In the absence
of a substantive, judicially created doctrine resolving that uncertainty, it is inviting to call forth the amorphous and ill defined political question doctrine.
Much of the confusion concerning the doctrine results from a
failure to separately consider its special significance in disputes involving allocation of the foreign affairs power, and to untangle the
two strands there involved. If the doctrine evolves from the finality
need, then it should result in a determination of constitutionality
without consideration of the underlying merits. The political decision
should be protected, and, if necessary, implemented by the Court. If,
116. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
117. Yee supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
118, See supra text accompanying notes 39-57.
119, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss2/1

30

Champlin and Schwarz: Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs

19851

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

however, the doctrine evolves from substantive uncertainty, then it
should indeed result in that most rare species, issue non-justiciability, on account of non-correctable ignorance. It would indeed
be ironic that the same doctrine in one configuration - implementation of the finality value - subordinates constitutionality to order,
and in its second configuration -

issue non-justiciability -

pro-

duces disorder. We conclude this paper with a suggested substantive
standard governing allocation of the foreign affairs power, thus
mooting the contention that allocation questions are non-justiciable
because of a lack of standards. 120 That leaves for present consideration the finality concern as it relates to allocation questions.
There is absolutely no question that unilateral presidential action in foreign affairs, whether or not pursuant to legitimate constitutional authority, may create an overwhelming need for finality.
That may be part of the Vietnam War political question case resolutions. Since the President has control over the physical apparatus of
government, and Congress does not, he or she can create facts, Congress only words. Consequently, it might follow that congressional
"action," being less likely to create an overwhelming need for finality, is less likely to be a political question than is presidential action
involving the identical allocation question. The President, for example, may effect a merit determination in an action brought to declare
the War Powers Resolution 121 unconstitutional as an intrusion on the
presidential power over foreign affairs, but Congress is precluded by
the doctrine from obtaining a merit determination of its claim that a
presidential commitment of troops is in excess of his or her constitutional power.
In fact, however, both claims should be resolved on the merits,
because finality concerns should never invoke the doctrine in an allocation dispute. Unauthorized presidential action may implicate finality concerns as much as joint branch action but in an allocation dispute, the rightful holder is by constitutional definition and by
practical experience the proper institution to measure the significance of the finality concern. The finality concern is not an indisputable absolute, and its relative significance depends upon the ability
to exercise policy alternatives. The rightful holder is such because it
-

not the Court -

should make the policy determination, and be-

cause it has an assortment of other powers relevant to the problem
120.
121.

See infra pp. 252-56.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
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beyond the remedial arsenal of the Court. The cure is less likely to
be worse than the disease when the doctor has an assortment of pal-

liative options short of amputation. In a given case, an overwhelming
need for finality may present Congress with no practical alternative
to endorsement. Even there, however, the proper institution, with the

power to effectuate lesser alternatives and with far greater pertinent
experience than the Court, has exercised its legitimate power.122
Moreover, there would be far fewer agonizing congressional decisions because the merit determination itself will, operating as123a precedent, reduce the frequency of future unauthorized action.
B.

Allocation and Lack of Standards

In 1978, President Carter announced that the United States
would withdraw from its treaty with Taiwan as part of a major foreign policy initiative normalizing relations between the United States
and the People's Republic of China.124 Senator Barry Goldwater
brought suit challenging President Carter's unilateral withdrawal,
alleging that the President acted unconstitutionally in taking such
action without the participation of Congress, either in the form of
two thirds Senate advice and consent 25 or majority congressional
approval. 2 Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, 27 concluding that the action should be dismissed on
political question grounds. 28 In Rehnquist's view, the controversy
was a political question because the Constitution does not explicitly
allocate a treaty withdrawal power, and, therefore, does not yield
122. Even in the situation where subjudice uncertainty is intolerable, Congress can respond by ratifying the presidential action prior to Court resolution of the separation issue.
123. It is instructive and hopeful to note that in the last allocation controversy where the
political question doctrine might have been invoked on finality grounds, it was not. Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The President resolved the Iranian hostage dispute by
executive agreement arguably in excess of his power, but for the United States to have reneged
might have had very serious consequences. The Court decided the merits, id. at 686-88, perhaps aware that to invalidate the action on account of lack of authority would have allowed
the proper institution, Congress, to itself decide whether the consequences would be dire and to
make that decision in the context of policy alternatives not available to the Court.
124. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1978, at Al, col. 6.
125. The United States Constitution confers presidential power to make treaties provided two thirds of the Senate concurs. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
126. Withdrawal from the treaty was not in contravention of the treaty since it was
provided for by the treaty. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979). Therefore, only the allocation question was at issue. 617 F.2d at 703-09.
127. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
128. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J.). Justice Powell made up the majority of five, voting to
dismiss on ripeness grounds. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
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sufficient standards for court resolution; 12 9 he further reasoned that
dismissal for lack of standards is particularly appropriate where the
contending parties can adequately protect their interests in the political process.' 30
We have concluded that "lack of standards" in the wrongful
exercise context is a merit determination of constitutionality. 3' In
the allocation context, lack of standards can also yield a merit determination. The result in Goldwater, then, could have been based on a
determination that an uncertain allocation of power is presumed to
be a concurrent allocation, exerciseable by either branch. Since Congress did not contest the withdrawal, it would not have been necessary to determine the question of preeminence."" Alternatively, it
could have been concluded that Goldwater presented a true political
question for the reason that the opening to mainland China, constitutional or not, set a course whose alteration would have profoundly
disruptive effects: Finality concerns dictate that the decision be left
undisturbed, its constitutionality assumed.' 33 Again, this is a merit
decision.134 Justice Rehnquist's opinion, however, is not on the merits. His failure to mention any finality value is inconsistent with the
finding of a true political question. His suggestion that the case
might be resolved differently if the plaintiff were a private individual 35 is inconsistent with either type of merit decision, as is his observation that state courts might not be bound by the instant decision.' 36 Instead, Rehnquist is saying that in the absence of standards
the Court cannot determine or assume the merits; it can only do
129. Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J.).
130. Id. at 1004.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 39-57.
132. Justice Powell's position may be essentially the one here stated except that he labels the matter a ripeness defect rather than a FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal on the
merits. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring). His "ripeness" concept however, must be based on the fact that the President's unilateral action is constitutional - at
least until such time as Congress expresses a policy to the contrary. The question of preeminence arises only when the branches disagree. Alternatively, Powell might have concluded that
the issue is not "ripe" for a congressperson whose injury depends on presidential actions contrary to congressional directive, but would be "ripe" if the plaintiff was an individual who had
sustained economic injury as a result of the President's action. If so, then Powell's opinion
contains no view as to the consititutionality of the President's action.
133. We would disagree, since we believe that allocation disputes never involve an overwhelming need for finality. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
134. See supra pp. 231-35.
135. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J.).
136. Id. at 1005.
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nothing. Lack of standards yields issue non-justiciability. 137
The plurality's recognition that the Court might decide the merits on suit by or against a private individual injured by the withdrawal suggests a completely different and independent basis for decision. It is passing strange that a question becomes more or less
answerable depending upon the identity of the parties.1 38 That the
justiciability of the controversy is said to possibly so vary reaffirms
our conviction that there is no such thing as a non-justiciable issue.
There may well be difficult issues that a court will avoid so long as it
is able. Its ability to do so may depend upon plaintiff's standing, and
there may be an interplay between the difficulty of an issue and the
applicable standing requirement. 3 9 But whatever the standing requirement and however it is determined, those considerations relate
to party status, not issue status, and are therefore irrelevant to the
political question doctrine and to issue non-justiciability. Goldwater,
then, might be simply a footnote to standing doctrine, albeit an unfortunate one since it invites continuing debate on the legitimacy of
presidential action. The problem with so characterizing the Rehnquist opinion is that it does not so characterize itself; indeed, it studiously avoids that characterization. Rehnquist obviously believes
that something more than standing is involved: The political question doctrine is implicated - the issue is non-justiciable.' 40
It may not make much practical difference whether the decision
in Goldwater is based on a merit determination, a true political
question, on plaintiff's lack of standing, or on issue non-justiciability.
137. The opinion heavily relies on Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). As already
discussed, we regard Coleman as a merit decision. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45,
84-85.
138. Rehnquist makes this distinction in attempting to reconcile his opinion with
Youngstown Sheet & Tool, the Steel Seizure case, where the Court did decide an allocation
claim. He distinguishes Youngstown on the basis of the difference in plaintiffs - i.e. a private
party in Youngstown versus a Congressperson in Goldwater - and then implies that if the
plaintiff had been a private party in Goldwater, the result might have been different. Although
he suggests that a different result might be appropriate based on the difference in political
weapons available to these plaintiffs, 444 U.S. at 1004 & n.1, it is not clear that this is true.
As observed by Professor Choper, where the issue involves a power struggle between Congress
or the Senate and the President, both political branches have access to effective political weapons. J. CHOPER, supra note 76, at 281-82. These weapons remain intact no matter who the
plaintiff is in a particular lawsuit. This observation is particularly cogent when one realizes
that the probable reason why a Congressperson resorts to judicial action is because she cannot
persuade Congress to act with regard to the matter challenged.
139. Bickel, supra note 23, at 75-76. See Scharpf, supra note 24, at 528-33 (Court's use
of procedural rules to screen cases raising constitutional issues).
140. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J.).
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In any event, the withdrawal stands, the opening to mainland China
effected. The Court, again, can get by with issue non-justiciability
rhetoric only because no ensuing enforcement proceeding is necessary, and it is unlikely that the withdrawal decision will need judicial
protection from interference by others. The potential problem, explicitly addressed in the Powell opinion, 141 did not arise in Goldwater. What happens if the President and Congress adopt inconsistent
courses, whether in respect of treaty withdrawal or any other foreign
policy initiative where constitutional allocation is uncertain? There,
the differences between a merit decision and a determination of issue
non-justiciability are likely to be more than academic. Pending an
uncertain political resolution, no one, including both Chinas, would
know the status of the treaty, or, consequently, of United StatesChinese relations. The Logan Act prohibits private persons from
conducting foreign relations on behalf of the United States.1 42 It is
much worse to have foreign affairs inconsistently conducted by multiple institutions, each asserting ostensible and nonreviewable authority. Inefficiency, indecisiveness, divisiveness and mutual charges of
illegitimacy are sure to follow. How ironic that a doctrine whose sole
justification is the preservation of order, even at the possible cost of
constitutionality, might apply to a situation requiring resolution, and,
if applicable, apply in a form prohibiting resolution and thus promoting disorder. As Justice Powell observes:
If the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable
positions, final disposition of the question presented by this case
would eliminate, rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations. The specter of the Federal Government brought to a
halt because of the mutual intransigence of the President and the
Congress would require this Court to provide a resolution pursuant
to our duty "'to say what the law is.' 1143
Justice Powell considers an inter-branch dispute to be justiciable -

indeed, for the reasons he gives, super-justiciable -

and criti-

cizes the Rehnquist opinion for indicating otherwise. 4 It is probable
145
that Powell's understanding of the Rehnquist opinion is correct. If
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 999-1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982).
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
144.
145.

Id. at 998-1001 (Powell, J., concurring).
It is probable, but not certain. Rehnquist's position could be that although it cannot
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the text does not clearly allocate the withdrawal power where the
President has acted alone, it probably does not allocate the power
any more clearly where the branches have acted inconsistently. The
Rehnquist opinion suggests that the Court may "force" a construction where a powerless individual is adversely affected. From that
perspective, however, there is no reason to do so where the contestants each have political power and where their respective shares of
power do not vary depending upon whether they agree, disagree or
merely fail to act.
A merit decision - preserving order, constitutionalism and legitimacy - is probably most important in an allocation dispute. Issue non-justiciability should not exist in any context, and it is unfortunate that under the Court's plurality opinion it seems to exist in
the area where it creates the most mischief. Resolution should take
the form of a garden variety merit determination, for an allocation
dispute cannot be a true political question. First, because the finality
value will not ordinarily be implicated in any dispute. Although resolution is important, staying on course may not be. Second, even
where finality is important, a merit determination will allow the legitimate powerholder to determine its importance and act accordingly. 14 Finally, it would be impossible, in any event, to apply the
doctrine to an allocation dispute. The heart of the doctrine is its assumption of constitutionality. It is possible to assume constitutionality where unified, governmental wrongful exercise is in question; it is
not possible where the sole issue is which one of two inconsistent
actions was valid. To assume the constitutionality of two inconsistent
actions is to create an anomaly that has no place in constitutional
adjudication.
C. Toward the Development of Allocation Standards
in Foreign Relations
We agree with Justice Powell that an allocation claim, especially where the branches have acted inconsistently, urgently rebe determined whether the President has unilateral power to withdraw from a treaty, it is clear

that Congress and the President, together, have that power, and that two-thirds of Congress
can act, overcoming presidential opposition. In other words, he could be sure that two-thirds of

Congress is preeminent in case of conflict without knowing whether the President has unilateral power to act in the matter. It is impossible to be certain of Rehnquist's position with
regard to court resolution of the conflict situation. Justice Powell, however, who presumably is

in a good position to know, clearly takes Rehnquist to mean that he would not resolve the
conflict situation.
146.

See supra pp. 246-48.
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quires judicial resolution. 14 7 A need for resolution, however, does not
supply a means for resolution. Justice Rehnquist's opinion states that
the Constitution does not provide an answer to the question of
whether the President may unilaterally withdraw the United States

from a treaty.'48 We quarrel with his use of the phrase "political
question" to describe that phenomenon, and we disagree with the
conclusion that the Constitution's failure to explicitly or clearly resolve the issue results in the Court's inability to resolve the controversy. We do, however, completely agree that if the Constitution
does not provide the answer to a constitutional question, the Court,

definitionally, cannot find the answer. How could it be otherwise?
Underlying Justice Rehnquist's position is an assumption that

the Constitution allocates the withdrawal power but the Court is unable to ascertain the intended allocation; since the Court cannot ascertain what was intended, it cannot and hence will not resolve the
controversy. The opinion asserts that it is merely applying existing
lack of standards doctrine: If manageable standards do not exist,
the issue is non-justiciable. Since we believe that a determination of
lack of standards in wrongful exercise cases is a merit determination,
Rehnquist is either creating issue non-justiciability for the first time,
149
or applying a doctrine that exists only in allocation cases.
147. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001-02 (Powell, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J.).
149. Not only does Rehnquist say that lack of standards creates issue non-justiciability,
he also says that it is essentially indistinguishable from party non-justiciability, hence not
binding on state courts. Goldwater, 444 U.S. 1005 (Rehnquist, J.). This seems to suggest that
although the Supreme Court will not interfere with President Carter's unilateral withdrawal,
the Supreme Court of Iowa may freely do so. But Rehnquist's statement that state courts
could decide political questions was qualified: "so long as they do not trench upon exclusively
federal questions of foreign policy." Id. at 1005 n.2, (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
441 (1968)). In Zschernig, the Court noted that the state's interest must yield where there is a
"great potential for disruption or embarrassment" which the Court believed exists where a
state court undertakes an inquiry into "the actual administration of foreign law . . . [and]
• * . the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements." 389 U.S. at 435. The Taiwan treaty
issue may be within this qualification. One does wonder, however, why Justice Rehnquist raises
this issue in the text when there is no need to do so, if he means to negate it in his footnote.
A true political question would be protected by the Court from all interference. Even if
the issue were non-justiciable, this species of non-justiciability should be treated differently
than the party variety such as mootness or lack of standing. Party non-justiciability, for example, does not assume that constitutional intent is non-ascertainable, but simply relates to the
nature of the injury necessary to activate the federal judicial process - arguably different
than that appropriate to a state's judicial process. Here, however, if the controversy is nonjusticiable it is so because the constitutional standard is not ascertainable by the Supreme
Court, and, therefore, by any other court. If a state court should pretend to answer the unanswerable, that decision should be vacated by the Supreme Court on lack of humility grounds.
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Is there a distinction between lack of standards in the wrongful
exercise and allocation contexts which resolves into merit constitutionality in the former and non-justiciability in the latter? If a court
is unsure of the parameters of a constitutional prohibition or of
whether the defined parameters have been exceeded, it should validate the action pursuant to a presumption of constitutionality. Thus,
lack of standards yields merit constitutionality in the wrongful exercise situation. 150 Where the controversy is about allocation, however,
resolution by presumption is not possible. The question is not
whether the governmental power exists, since in foreign affairs that
is assumed, or whether it has been rightly exercised; that, in the absence of a clear standard of prohibition, is presumed. Rather, the
question is which of two coordinate branches has the power to act. In
foreign affairs, we know a priori that governmental power exists. If
we did not know it a priori we would not know it at all because only
a few components of that power are specified. In many instances treaty withdrawal is but one example - since the governmental
power itself is not specified, it obviously is not allocated. Each
branch can lay claim to the power as implied or derivative from another textually specified power. And that's the rub. The governmental power exists. Each branch has an arguable claim to it. The competing claims cannot be resolved by presumption, however, because
the branches are coordinate. Hence, issue non-justiciability arises
from non-answerability.
Let us examine why it may be difficult, or impossible, to resolve
an allocation question. The framers, perhaps, intended to resolve the
issue but stated it inartfully, or they never thought of the problem a true lacuna. Or, they thought of the problem but could not agree
on the resolution, leaving the stalemate to future decision by someone else. Or, they thought of the problem but agreed that resolution
could not be constitutionalized or at least not constitutionalized right
then. Resolution should vary over time depending upon the shape of
the world and the role of the United States in that evolving world.
Do these possibilities, or any of them, resolve in favor of judicial
abstention, or do they suggest a basis for a merit determination?
Assume that the intent was to leave the issue unresolved, to allow standards to evolve over time through the political process - the
War Powers Resolution, 5 1 Lend Lease, 1 2 the Neutrality Act,' 53 etc.
150.
151.
152.

See supra text accompanying notes 39-57.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
22 U.S.C. §§ 411-419 (1970).
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To the extent that a future political resolution was intended, that
political resolution, whatever it may be, is constitutional and legitimate. Justice Rehnquist in Goldwater foresees political resolution,
but seems to view it as the practical consequence of an inability to
judicially ascertain a precise constitutionally intended allocation4
5
standard, rather than as the constitutionally intended standard.
Would he characterize action taken pursuant to the War Powers
Resolution or contrary to its terms as a political question, inviting
claims of illegitimacy, or would he use that act as the constitutionally derived standard?
Even assuming that a precisely delineated constitutional allocation standard was intended but cannot be ascertained, that failure
should result in adoption of the "second best" solution, a validation
of the political resolution as the only workable alternative. We suspect that the Court would adopt the political resolution of an allocation question as the constitutional standard where it does not conflict
with a more precise allocation made in the Constitution and where
155
the political resolution is accomplished through a legislative act.
In that situation, action consistent with the legislation would be upheld and inconsistent action invalidated, both decisions on the
merits.
Goldwater raises problems because it involves a situation where
the politically resolved allocation was not in legislative form. Is action taken by other political means, however, a less valid resolution?
In respect of presidential action it is less valid if it is assumed that
the power stems exclusively from article I of the Constitution. In
that event, at least a majority of Congress would be necessary for
valid resolution, as is of course the case with respect to domestic
affairs. Stalemate, however, is usually more dangerous in foreign
than in domestic matters. That is a reason for finding that the power
does not emanate exclusively from article I. More significantly, if it
did so emanate, there would be a clear and precise constitutional
allocation, no need to use a political resolution standard and certainly no occasion to find issue non-justiciability. The intended allo153.

Neutrality Act, ch.2, 54 Stat. 1 (1939).

154. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J.).
155.

See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99, 901 (D.D.C. 1982) (court re-

fused to engage in fact-finding regarding the military situation in El Salvador, noting that
Congress has both the resources and the mechanism, under the War Powers Resolution Act, to

"reclaim its constitutional power to declare war"), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984).
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cation, and hence the merit result, would also be clear if the power
were found to derive exclusively from article II, an exclusive presi-

dential prerogative. The uncertainty, and hence the utility of a political resolution standard is therefore limited to situations where a

careful examination of the usual sources of constitutionalism - text,
history, practice, and need - yields no answer or, far more likely,
supports both article I and article II origins: Each branch can lay
claim to the power. Under a political resolution standard, the Court
should then presume that the framers intended that more precise de-

lineation of the allocation question was to be politically determined.
Where the political resolution standard is applicable and where
there has been no politically agreed upon resolution, then both
branches, or either, may act under their respective articles. The difference is that Congress may only act under article I with presidential approval, or by a two-thirds overriding vote, while the President

may act unilaterally under article II. Given the momentum created
by action, presidential action is likely to prevail, by congressional
approval or acquiescence. This gives the President an enormous advantage, but an advantage only in areas which, by hypothesis, do not
clearly call for a different standard.156 In areas that do, a more precise, constitutionally based standard would be ascertainable.15 7 Un156. For an opinion that generally takes a view similar to the one here expressed, see
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971). Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Professor Choper has taken the position that courts should never resolve allocation of
power claims between Congress and the President. CHOPER, supra note 76, at 263, 378-79. By
using its limited credit to decide these matters, otherwise adequately resolved by the political
process, the courts would be hampered in their principal role of protecting individual liberties.
Id. at 169. Despite the "issue non-justiciability" label, under Choper's proposal, a court would
not only avoid interference with a political resolution, but would implement it, where necessary. See supra note 76. As a practical matter, then, his proposal in some respects is similar to
the one here proposed. It differs, however, in that while we would limit political resolution to
situations where there are insufficient constitutional criteria for decision, Professor Choper
would extend it to situations where the constitutional standard is clear. See id. at 336, 349-52.
Our proposal relates to constitutional interpretation, his, seemingly, to constitutional amendment via the "non-justiciability" route.
157. For instance, there is a common and perhaps accurate assumption that only Congress may engage the country in a war, at least in the absence of emergency. War making may
be exclusively an article I power. If the President unilaterally engages the U.S. in a war and is
thereby acting unconstitutionally, and the Court so holds, Congress, not the Court, should deal
with the finality consequences. Not every military action, however, even short of emergency, is
a war. Those actions are within articles I and II. They may, perhaps should, be worked out
through legislation such as The War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982). See also
Carter, The Constitutionalityof the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101 (1984). On
the other hand, Congress might not be able to completely surrender its war declaring power to
the President. In that situation there might be a precise constitutional standard that the Court
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less the power was found by the Court to reside exclusively in article

II, Congress, in the end, has the allocated power to reverse the policy, either by so determining and overriding a veto, or by refusing to

allocate the necessary funds, a power which should clearly exist
where Congress has independent, concurrent power over the subject
matter. Indeed, the appropriation function was probably given exclu-

sively to Congress because that body was intended to be dominant in
extremis, and because it was intended that other power be exercised

concurrently,' 158 with the attendant advantages that concurrence creates for the President.

Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Goldwater makes treaty withdrawal, de facto, a concurrent power. It recognizes the naked power

of the two branches to resolve the allocation issue, by orderly agreement or otherwise. Unfortunately, it suggests that the presidential

action, although probably unassailable, may be completely illegitimate, thereby inviting destructive political hoopla. The opinion
should have made the merit determination that in the absence of

inconsistent and overriding congressional action, the withdrawal was
15 9
constitutional.
CONCLUSION

The varied and imprecise use of the political question doctrine
has created unnecessary confusion and destroyed its utility. Its use in
wrongful exercise situations on account of claimed absence of standards masks the true significance of such a dismissal, which is, in
could and should apply. Cf. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
941-43 (1983) (reiterating the Court's authority to review the constitutionality of congressional action).
158. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971). The court observed
that:
The objective of the drafters of the Constitution was to give each branch "constitutional arms for its own defense." The Federalist No. 23 at 476 (Mod. Lib. ed.)
(Hamilton). But the advantage was given to Congress, Hamilton noting the "superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government, and the
hazards to the Executive in the trial of strength with that body." Id. at 478.
Id. at 34. See also U.S. v Capps, 204 F.2d 655 (1953), aff d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296
(1955); The 'Yale Papert--Indo China: The Constitutional Crisis, Part II, 116 CONG. REC.
S7591-$7593 (May 21, 1970).
159. Two recent Supreme Court opinions dealing with division of powers between the
President and Congress, interestingly both written by Justice Rehnquist, are not inconsistent
with the approach suggested here. Although in neither case is the issue here discussed centrally involved, both opinions to some extent, support this view. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981).
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fact, a merit determination of constitutionality. More significantly,
the imprecision with which the doctrine is defined allows it to be
invoked in any circumstance where it is difficult to come to a merit
determination, no matter what the nature of that difficulty. Where
the doctrine is used to avoid a merit determination as to who is the
proper exerciser of a foreign relations power, it is especially troubling, since in these matters resolution is particularly important. Further, if the political question dismissal in this context is a de facto
merit determination, as we suspect it is, then the doctrine's use results in a merit determination without any consideration of the merits, greatly increasing the risk of a wrong decision. There is similarly
no independent merit determination in the one circumstance that we
believe is a true political question - the acceptance and protection
of a political decision because finality is essential. Unlike the allocation situation, however, in a true political question situation there is
no alternative but to accept the political decision, and the precedential value of the merit determination is limited to the need for finality under that specific set of circumstances.
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